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WHAT IS THE EPISTEMIC 
SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT? 
N. Gabriel MARTIN 
 
ABSTRACT: Over the past decade, attention to epistemically significant disagreement has 
centered on the question of whose disagreement qualifies as significant, but ignored 
another fundamental question: what is the epistemic significance of disagreement? While 
epistemologists have assumed that disagreement is only significant when it indicates a 
determinate likelihood that one’s own belief is false, and therefore that only 
disagreements with epistemic peers are significant at all, they have ignored a more subtle 
and more basic significance that belongs to all disagreements, regardless of who they are 
with—that the opposing party is wrong. It is important to recognize the basic significance 
of disagreement since it is what explains all manners of rational responses to 
disagreement, including assessing possible epistemic peers and arguing against opponents 
regardless of their epistemic fitness.  
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In epistemology over the past decade a lively discussion about disagreement has 
focussed on the conditions under which disagreement becomes epistemically 
significant. This dispute ignores the more basic question—what significance can or 
does disagreement have? 
Although this basic question has not been explored in the literature, the way 
that the literature asks its own question presupposes an answer. In this article I will 
raise the question of whether the significance of disagreement presupposed by the 
epistemology of disagreement really is the significance disagreement has. I will 
argue that the significance presupposed throughout the sub-field—that 
disagreement qualifies the likelihood of the falsity of one’s own belief—is not its 
most general or basic. Disagreement’s significance does not concern oneself but 
rather one’s opponent. It is that the person with whom one disagrees is wrong. 
I will defend this claim and explain why it matters. First, I will explain how 
the discussion of the epistemological consequences of disagreement presuppose 
what I will call a self-reflexive significance. This will allow me, in section two, to 
show why this significance cannot belong generally to all disagreements, but can 
only belong to disagreements when they possess certain qualifying characteristics. 
That will in turn make it possible, in section three, to settle a current debate 
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within the sub-field concerning whether the peerhood of interlocutors is to be 
presupposed. Disagreement only possesses this significance conditionally, and it is 
only when it has been determined to meet certain conditions that it can be 
considered significant. This raises the crucial question—what reason is there to 
evaluate disagreements on the basis of peerhood? There must be some basic and 
general significance belonging to disagreement as such that makes evaluating 
opponents make sense. I will address this question in section four. Finally, in 
section five, I will explain why this matters—the epistemological significance of 
disagreement is not simply what it indicates about your own belief, but what it 
indicates about the beliefs of others. This means that the epistemic significance of 
disagreement is fundamentally social and intersubjective. 
1. Disagreement’s Self-Reflexive Significance 
Let me restate the question: what significance can or does disagreement have? An 
answer to this question would have to disclose the significance of disagreement 
itself—whether disagreement on some matter, in and of itself, has any bearing on 
that matter. Put another way, the question is whether any light can be shed on 
that which we disagree about (the disputandum) by the very fact that we disagree 
about it. The strictly epistemic question is insensitive to the many additional 
questions about the context of the disagreement, including the psychology of its 
participants or their social relations, that could be raised. Doubtless, dispute tells us 
something about the attitudes of the people involved, and controversy tells us 
something about the culture in which it exists, but the epistemology of 
disagreement sets these matters asides. It is concerned narrowly with whether the 
mere fact that there is a disagreement can indicate something about the 
disputandum, either directly or indirectly. 
The question of the significance of disagreement also excludes questions 
about the significance of the positions in conflict themselves. Of course a 
disagreement consists of positions, hopefully supported by reasons and evidence, 
which bear upon the disputed matter in all sorts of relevant ways. This is not what 
epistemology of disagreement is concerned with either. The epistemic significance 
of disagreement itself is not due to the significance of those positions or what 
supports them: it is due solely to the significance of the fact that the matter is in 
dispute. 
It has been proposed that the epistemic significance of disagreement, defined 
in such a narrow way, is profound. Disagreement may bring with it sceptical 
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consequences if it can indicate an increased likelihood of error on one’s own part.1 
This view is shared by many within the sub-field.2 If disagreement can indicate, 
either generally or under certain circumstances, that there is considerable chance 
that you have formed an incorrect belief, then diminished confidence in your 
position is warranted. This is the way that the problem of disagreement was 
originally framed by Sextus Empiricus.3 
Most contributors to the literature are in agreement that the appropriate 
response to epistemically significant disagreement is to become less confident in 
the correctness of one’s own position.4 That is, there is a consensus among most 
social epistemologists that faced with a disagreement of epistemic significance a 
person should check the confidence with which they hold their controversial 
position. That diminished confidence is the appropriate response to any 
disagreement which possesses epistemic significance is rarely disputed.5 Instead, 
                                                        
1 As considered here, the problem of disagreement only arises for those involved—it is not a 
question of what disagreement means for one who occupies a neutral position, but what 
disagreement means when you are one of the parties embroiled in it. 
2 For example, see Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41, 3 (2007): 497; Robert 
Mark Simpson, “Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Philosophical 
Studies 164, 2 (2013): 561-577; Ernest Sosa, “The Epistemology of Disagreement,” in Social 
Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 278-297. Others disagree. According to Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic 
Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1, ed. John 
Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005), 191, diminished 
confidence in the correctness of one’s own position should not be the consequence of any 
disagreement, but that is because he denies that there are any epistemically significant 
disagreements. 
3 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, trans. Julia Annas, and Jonathan Barnes (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 41. 
4 See especially Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 497. There is, however, no obligation 
to diminish confidence according to those who deny the claim that there is a unique rational 
doxastic response to any body of evidence (See Nathan Ballantyne, E.J. Coffman, “Uniqueness, 
Evidence, and Rationality,” Philosophers’ Imprint 11, 18 [2011]: 1-13; Roger White, “Epistemic 
Permissiveness,” Philosophical Perspectives 19, 1 [2005]: 445–459). However if permissiveness 
should apply to two conflicting theories, it does not seem appropriate to call this a disagreement, 
since while the two theories conflict they do not invalidate one another. 
5 An exception is Gurpreet Rattan “Disagreement and the First-Person Perspective,” Analytic 
Philosophy 55, 1 (2014): 331–353. Rattan argues that disagreement between epistemic peers 
indicates that there is a misunderstanding or equivocation at work, and that “the epistemic limits 
of intersubjective understanding” (Rattan, “Disagreement and the First-Person Perspective,” 351) 
justify what he calls “limited permission to persist in confidence” (Rattan, “Disagreement and the 
First-Person Perspective,” 350) until the matter is cleared up. 
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the debate is over whether there exist any disagreements which in and of 
themselves call for that response.6 
I will ask a different question. Disagreement that has sceptical consequences 
for a reasonable participant must have a certain kind of significance. My question 
is: what kind of significance is it that would call for diminished confidence? 
2. Self-Reflexive Significance Is Limited to Only Some Disagreements 
For starters, this shows that the significance of disagreement is conceived in a 
strictly negative way—its significance is in indicating (in some way we have not 
determined yet) that beliefs about the matter are wrong. There are no other 
possibilities given that what we are considering is in no case direct or first-order 
evidence about the disputandum, but second-order evidence. It therefore pertains 
to the disputandum indirectly, by giving evidence about the truth or falsity of the 
beliefs about the disputandum itself. As such, all it can do is undercut the 
confidence with which a belief is held.  
The simple possibility of error cannot be what calls for doubt in the face of 
disagreement. It is possible for your belief to be in error, but it is the fallibility of 
the belief itself which signifies this, and a disagreement can only be a reminder of 
the possibility of error if it is already acknowledged. If disagreement can tell you 
anything more about the possibility that you are wrong in a given case, it is 
because it is already a characteristic of your belief that it may not be right. The 
possibility of being wrong is a precondition for a fact to provide evidence that you 
are wrong—without the possibility of error, facts surrounding your belief could 
never have anything to do with the possibility that you could be wrong. 
Disagreement must tell you something about the possibility that your belief 
is false if it calls for you to be less confident in your position. Only an indication 
concerning the likelihood that your belief is wrong can give you any reason to 
doubt it. The significance of disagreement must indicate something about the 
                                                        
6 See David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical 
Review 116, 2 (2007): 187–217; David Christensen, “Disagreement as Evidence: The 
Epistemology of Controversy,” Philosophy Compass 4, 5 (2009): 756–767; Richard Foley, 
Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ernest 
Sosa, “The Epistemology of Disagreement,” in Social Epistemology, eds. Alan Millar and Duncan 
Pritchard Adrian Haddock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 278–97.. In “Disagreement 
as Evidence,” David Christensen characterises this as a debate between what he calls 
‘conciliatory’ and ‘steadfast’ views. That is, between interpretations of the significance of 
disagreement which hold that the rational response is to move closer, in some way or another, to 
the views of your interlocutor, and interpretations that hold that, in the face of disagreement, 
you are obligated to retain the confidence in your beliefs that you had going in. 
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likelihood of error if it is to warrant diminished confidence, because it is only if it 
qualifies the already certain possibility of error that it tells you something new. 
This response must be justified by additional information about the 
likelihood that your belief is in error. That is to say, more must be determined 
about the quality or character of the disagreement. Only disagreement of a 
particular character can have the kind of significance which would call for you to 
lose even some confidence in your belief. But can disagreement of a certain type 
indicate the likelihood that one is in error?7  
The insignificance of unqualified disagreement is the reason that the 
epistemology of disagreement is only concerned with qualified disagreement. It is 
only the disagreement of peers or superiors, which is to say those who are at least 
as likely as oneself to have knowledge of the matter in dispute, that is meaningful. 
Peerhood, or the relative epistemic fitness of those with whom one finds 
oneself in dispute, is a handy way to indicate what kind of qualification of a 
disagreement would have the epistemic significance that we are talking about.8 If I 
know that my opponent is as likely as I am to be right about the disputandum, then 
I also know that the likelihood of error on my own part is high; at least 50 per 
cent.9 
The qualification of a given disagreement as a peer disagreement 
distinguishes it considerably from disagreement in general. The possibility that any 
one of my beliefs could be false is not determinate in any way (I cannot ascribe any 
statistical or comparative character to it), but a disagreement between peers is 
qualitatively determinate. Peer disagreement carries a significance that pertains to 
the likelihood of error in my position; it indicates that I am no more likely to be 
right than the person who challenges me. This does not mean that in a peer 
disagreement I am more likely to be wrong than in any other, unqualified 
disagreement—it means that in a peer disagreement the likelihood that I am wrong 
is certain, whereas in the other it is totally indeterminate. 
                                                        
7 That it is by way of indicating an increased likelihood of error that a disagreement could 
indicate the need to revise one’s confidence is assumed generally in the sub field. Christensen 
gets closest to explicitly stating it when he remarks “arbitrating the dispute from one’s own 
perspective need not entail disregarding evidence that one might be wrong” (Christensen, 
“Epistemology of Disagreement,” 762). It is assumed here by Christensen that ‘evidence that one 
might be wrong’ is precisely what is in question. 
8 See Bryan Frances, Disagreement (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 45ff for what he calls ‘likelihood 
definitions’ of peerhood.  
9 Of course, this conclusion is disputed. However, there is broad consensus that a conclusion 
along these lines follows from disagreement among true peers. More controversy centres around 
the likelihood or possibility of finding such peers. 
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Since a peer disagreement is defined by the fact that the likelihood that I am 
wrong and the likelihood that my opponent is wrong are on par with one another, 
the response that social epistemologists generally believe peer disagreement calls 
for—diminished confidence—is justified. When I already know that I could be 
wrong, the fact that I disagree with one of my peers tells me that there is a good 
chance that I actually am wrong. Once again, we can compare this to disagreement 
of an unqualified kind, which tells me nothing about the relationship of this 
instance to that invariant possibility. 
Is this the significance of disagreement—that it can inform me about the 
likelihood that I am in error? That is the consensus in the sub-field, and it is why 
most of the discussion concerns the conditions under which an opponent can and 
must be considered one’s peer. In the section that follows, I will briefly explain 
some of the key positions in this debate. As I explain, a key determinant as to 
whether the disagreements we find ourselves in can be expected to show 
themselves to be peer disagreements comes down to whether or not peerhood can 
be thought to be assumed by default, or whether it must be demonstrated. I argue 
that it must be demonstrated, and that this points to the existence of a more basic 
and general significance of disagreement. 
3. Peerhood Cannot Be Assumed 
Is it the case that disagreement itself is enough to disqualify an adversary from 
peerhood with respect to the matter, as Thomas Kelly and Ernest Sosa argue?10 Can 
you consider your opponent less likely than you are to be right, simply on the basis 
of their being your opponent, or having beliefs which you believe to be wrong? It 
would seem to follow from your having a belief that anyone who rejected that 
belief was in your lights far less likely to have knowledge of the matter. 
Or, is it necessary to assess your interlocutors on grounds that are 
independent of the reasoning supporting the position that brings you into conflict, 
as David Christensen claims?11 He argues that, in order to avoid begging the 
question against your interlocutors, assessment must be on grounds other than that 
which is at issue in the disagreement in question.  
Even if independent grounds for dismissing an adversary as sub-par are 
required, in real-world controversies are peers likely to be thin on the ground, as 
                                                        
10 See Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 2005 and Sosa, “The Epistemology of 
Disagreement,” 2010. 
11 Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreeement,” 2007. 
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Adam Elga argues,12 because the basis on which to assess the likelihood of being 
right of those who do not share your views is lacking? 
Elga makes the latter claim because our disagreements about controversial 
questions are generally not anomalies. Rather, disagreements arise within polarised 
and polarising “clusters of controversy”13 and when those with whom you disagree 
on one thing tend to disagree with you on all or most related questions as well, you 
are not going to find the means to assess their level of expertise in that general 
area. 
All of the conceptions of interlocutor assessment discussed here in brief 
concern how peerhood or non-peerhood is to be determined. What none of these 
considerations take into account is whether or not interlocutors must be 
considered peers by default or whether peerhood must be earned. However, this 
question is, if not decisive, at least of great significance with respect to the 
determination. This is because, as Elga points out, assessment will often be 
impossible to accomplish and therefore the question of whether or not a particular 
interlocutor is one’s peer will come down to whether or not they must be 
considered one prior to assessment. This question has become the focus of some 
more recent attention in the sub-field. 
Peerhood cannot be a default. That is because it means that you are no more 
likely to be right than you are to be wrong. Not just any disagreement can have 
that significance, nor can just any adversary be considered peer. This is not because 
a peer disagreement necessarily means that your likelihood of being wrong is 
higher than it is in a disagreement with an unqualified interlocutor. It isn’t. The 
relative likelihood that you are wrong in an unqualified disagreement is uncertain, 
so it may be higher or lower or identical to that in a peer disagreement. Peerhood 
cannot be a default precisely because it denotes demonstration of the relative 
likelihood of the possibility that yours is the position that is wrong in the dispute. 
It is only once your opponent has been found to be at least as likely as yourself to 
be right about the matter that their disagreement has the kind of significance 
concerned: the ability to “say” something about the likelihood of error in your own 
position. Without a demonstration of the relative likelihood of your opponent’s 
being right, the fact that a true disagreement means that one or the other of you 
must be wrong does not in any way qualify the general, indeterminate possibility 
that you could be wrong that you must acknowledge from the start. 
Peerhood only means something if it denotes specific characteristics of the 
interlocutor in question. Therefore it cannot be assumed. This means that the 
                                                        
12 Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 2007. 
13 Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 2007, 493. 
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assessment of interlocutors and discrimination between those that are peers and 
those that are not peers is crucial to appreciating the significance of disagreement, 
and if this assessment is not or cannot be performed then the disagreement cannot 
be considered ‘peer’. 
There are a few epistemologists who argue otherwise.14 Contesting Elga’s 
conclusion about controversy clusters, Robert Mark Simpson states that “remaining 
steadfast in the face of a disagreement is only justified when one has some basis for 
thinking that one’s opponents are epistemically less well-credentialed than oneself 
with respect to the subject of the disagreement.”15 In other words, one must have a 
reason for considering an opponent sub-par. Peerhood, Simpson assumes, is the 
default. 
In arguing against Elga from the assumption of default peerhood, Simpson 
also reveals that Elga’s argument is based on the contrary assumption—that 
peerhood must be demonstrated. ‘Clusters of controversy’ refers to the tendency of 
those with whom one disagrees about serious, real-world issues to also have 
conflicting views, by and large, about other, related matters. The consequence of 
these controversy clusters is that we can expect finding real disagreements with 
someone who can be deemed a peer to be rare. This is because determining that a 
particular interlocutor is an epistemic peer with respect to a particular matter is 
only possible after assessing their ability to get such things right. However, because 
controversies tend not to exist in isolation but in clusters, it is likely that when you 
disagree with someone on one question you will also disagree with them on related 
questions and so you will lack the kind of evidence of their being right (by your 
own lights) on the relevant sorts of questions necessary to establish their peerhood. 
The way that disagreements form in society makes it improbable for peerhood to 
be attributed to an opponent in a disagreement. 
The example offered by Elga is a disagreement about the ethics of abortion.16 
Elga supposes that we should expect two people who disagree about abortion also 
to disagree about related controversies, such as political affiliation, religion, and 
the definitions of life and personhood. The broad disagreement between the two 
means they lack any basis on which to establish the other’s peer bona fides. This 
                                                        
14 See Catherine Z. Elgin, Considered Judgment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); 
Richard Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” Epistemology Futures, ed. 
Stephen Hetherington (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006): 216–236; Robert Mark 
Simpson, “Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Philosophical Studies 
164, 2 (2013): 561–577; Ben Sherman, “Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness,” Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 45, 4 (2015): 425–444. 
15 Simpson, “Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” 576. 
16 Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 493. 
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means that each party will lack any basis on which to perform the required 
assessment of the epistemic capacity of their interlocutor. Essentially, Elga argues 
that if an opponent in a disagreement is going to qualify as one’s peer, their 
capacity to get the matter right must be demonstrated. And what is needed in 
order to demonstrate it is the possibility of pointing to the correctness of their 
views on related matters.  
Rather than taking on Elga’s factual claim that real-world disagreements 
exist within clusters of controversy, as Sarah McGrath and others do,17 Simpson 
disputes Elga’s views on what we are to make of the disagreements of those we 
cannot assess. Elga, we saw, takes the lack of any basis on which to establish an 
opponent’s credentials as sufficient grounds for their dismissal as sub-par. This 
makes sense because of his assumption that others are not to be considered one’s 
epistemic peers by default; that instead they must earn the right to be considered 
peers. 
Simpson, on the other hand, claims that one must consider a disputant one’s 
epistemic peer until one has evidence that they are not. Thus, the phenomenon of 
controversy clusters Elga will have a consequence opposite to that attributed to it 
by Elga.  
This difference in the epistemologies of disagreement of Elga and Simpson 
does not belong to the more frequently raised debate about that basis on which 
peerhood can be assessed, it is about whether assessment is necessary in the first 
place, and what happens if it cannot be performed. Although this only appears as 
an explicit theme in epistemology of disagreement in Ben Sherman (even Elga and 
Simpson do not make the importance of the question explicit),18 it determines for 
the most part whether or not peer disagreements, with the serious consequences 
                                                        
17 In “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise,” Oxford Studies In Metaethics, Vol. 3, ed. Russ 
Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 87–108, Sarah McGrath argues that 
while controversies do cluster, these clusters form upon common ground sufficient to allow for 
the assessment of opponents. 
18 In “Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness” Sherman brings attention to the role played by the 
decisive difference between what he calls “presumption of peerhood” and “presumption in 
favour of self-trust” (Sherman, “Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness,” 430). Shortly, I will 
explain how the problematic of presumption of peerhood differs from the problem of default 
peerhood. Whether or not a given theory of disagreement has it that others are to be considered 
peer by default plays an enormous role in determining whether peers, as that theory defines 
them, will be such as can be expected to be found. His answer to the question (See Sherman, 
“Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness,” 433–434) supports the complaints of Christensen and 
Simpson that to discount an adversary without adequate evidence of their epistemic inferiority is 
“question-begging” (See Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement,” 198 and Simpson, 
“Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” 575–576). 
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for doxastic confidence they bring with them, are likely to characterise the 
important controversies that dominate philosophy and the broader culture. 
The conflicting assumptions, implicit for the most part, about whether or 
not peerhood can be presupposed, are applicable in the kind of case considered by 
Elga, McGrath, and Simpson, in which what is at issue is what it is rational to 
believe about your interlocutor’s epistemic abilities in the absence of conclusive 
evidence one way or the other. Simpson’s opposition to what Sherman calls the 
“presumption in favour of self-trust”19 is motivated by the concern that to discount 
an adversary without adequate evidence of their epistemic inferiority is “question-
begging” or “bootstrapping.”20 Foley defends the presumption on the basis that a 
general prima facie trust in oneself is necessary for any knowledge at all.21 
Along the same lines, Sherman argues that there should be a “presumption 
of peerhood.”22 Discussing whether disagreement should come with a 
“presumption in favour of self-trust” as Foley argues,23 or a “presumption of 
peerhood”, Sherman argues that the right to legitimately dismiss an opponent as 
sub-par must be ‘earned’. Sherman calls this “earning a spine” in reference to Elga’s 
concern about “spinelessness” as a consequence of peer disagreement.24 
Spinelessness is Elga’s pejorative expression for accepting diminished confidence in 
the face of disagreement. Sherman’s point is that spinelessness can be overcome, 
but not without work. In other words, peerhood must be presupposed. 
Foley defends the presumption in favour of self-trust on the basis that the 
presupposition of a general prima facie trust in oneself is necessary for any 
                                                        
19 Sherman, “Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness,” 430. 
20 See Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement,” 198; Simpson, “Epistemic Peerhood and the 
Epistemology of Disagreement,” 575–576; Sherman, “Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness,” 
433–434. 
21 Richard Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 108. 
22 Sherman, “Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness,” 430. 
23 Foley defends the presumption in favour of self-trust on the basis that the presupposition of a 
general prima facie trust in oneself is necessary for any knowledge at all (See Foley, Intellectual 
Trust in Oneself and Others, 108). Self-trust is epistemically essential: even the decision to trust 
another is only possible because of a more fundamental trust in one’s own judgment that that 
trust is warranted. But just because there is always self-trust involved in any judgment, that does 
not mean that one is compelled to prefer one’s own judgments, reconsidered, over another’s. 
When one reconsiders one’s position in the way that is necessary in order to consider a 
disagreement, it is necessary to trust in the judgment being performed at the moment, but there 
is no epistemic necessity to trust the previous judgement just because it had been made by the 
same person, let alone prefer it to the judgment of an interlocutor. 
24 Sherman, “Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness,” 431. 
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knowledge at all.25 Self-trust is epistemically essential: even trust in another is only 
possible because of a more fundamental trust in one’s own judgment that they are 
to be trusted. 
This does not mean, however, that one is compelled to prefer one’s own 
judgments over another’s. When reconsidering one’s position in order to assess the 
significance that may or may not be presented by a disagreement it is necessary to 
trust in the judgment one is utilising at the moment. This does not mean that one is 
obligated to trust one’s previous judgement just because it happened to have been 
made by oneself, since it is not the judgment being relied upon at the moment. The 
fact that you are the same person who made the judgment that you must decide 
whether or not to prefer to that of your interlocutor does not preclude you from 
changing your mind and siding with them, because although the judgment was 
made by you it is a distinct act of judgment from the one which you are employing 
at present. Therefore, there is no obligation to trust it. 
Simpson and Sherman raise the important question of whether or not one’s 
adversaries must be assumed to be peers, or whether they can only be thought to 
be peers when positive evidence of their peerhood has been brought to bear. 
However, they approach the question from the wrong direction. What matters 
with respect to whether or not adversaries are to be considered peers by default is 
not what is rational to believe about the epistemic ability of those with whom we 
find ourselves in disagreement, but what the conditions are for finding 
disagreements in which we are involved to be epistemically significant. In this 
regard there can be no doubt, self-reflexive epistemic significance belongs to 
disagreements only on the condition that those disagreements are qualified by the 
peer condition or some similar factor which cannot be granted universally by 
default. 
It is not because of an epistemic principle, either that commanding self-trust 
or that proscribing question-begging, that peerhood cannot be presupposed. 
Peerhood cannot be presupposed because it stipulates a quality that distinguishes it 
from just any disagreement. It is only when peerhood names a quality that makes it 
possible to determine that the likelihood that one’s opponent in a disagreement is 
wrong is no higher than the likelihood that one is wrong oneself that peerhood can 
fulfil its essential function of distinguishing the class of disagreement that belongs 
to it from disagreement in general. If peerhood is presupposed, then it does not 
contain the crucial qualifying character that it is supposed to. If peerhood is 
default, then a peer disagreement no longer has the significance it is meant to 
                                                        
25 Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, 108. 
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have—indicating the likelihood of error on one’s own part. Default peerhood, 
therefore, is a meaningless notion. 
As long as disagreement is going to have any consequence involving 
diminished confidence in one’s own position, it will be necessary for some 
characteristic of the disagreement to contribute information about the likelihood 
of an error on one’s own part. If the characteristic in question is not the peerhood 
of one’s opponent, it must be some other qualifying characteristic. 
The quality of peerhood only makes sense if the difference between peer and 
non-peer is enforced. If everyone is your peer by default, then peerhood is not 
dependent upon evaluation. This equality of all speakers could not be called 
peerhood, which denotes a class, and it could not signify equality with respect to 
the likelihood of being right of you and your interlocutor. Only peerhood 
ascertained through assessment can denote equal likelihood of being right, while 
general equality of all speakers, which is a presupposition or a principle that is not 
given in evidence, can only denote that the relative likelihood of being right is 
indeterminate. If disagreement means only that you cannot know whether or not 
you are more or less or just as likely as your interlocutor to be right about the 
disputandum (which seems to me to be the correct interpretation of the meaning 
of disagreement according to Sextus) it does not bring with it the self-reflexive 
epistemic significance that calls for diminished confidence. 
4. The Intersubjective Significance of Disagreement 
In section one, I established that if the reasonable response to disagreement is 
reduction in the confidence one places in one’s own position, then the significance 
of disagreement must pertain to the likelihood that that position is in error. I also 
argued, in section two, that disagreement in general has no bearing on the 
probability of error—that in order for disagreement to indicate the likelihood of 
error, particular qualities belonging to a given disagreement or class of 
disagreements must indicate its likelihood. Consequently, peerhood cannot be the 
default for disagreement, as I argued in section three. As long as disagreement is 
going to have any consequence involving diminished confidence in one’s own 
position, it will be necessary for some characteristic of the disagreement to 
contribute information about the likelihood of an error on one’s own part. If the 
characteristic in question is not the peerhood of one’s opponent, it must be some 
other qualifying characteristic. 
That disagreement cannot call for diminished confidence until investigation 
has shown that one’s opponent is the kind whose disagreement can indicate even 
odds of error in either position (or until something else has contributed 
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comparatively relevant significance) gives rise to a surprising corollary. The 
necessity of assessment also means that the significance of disagreement which 
calls for diminished confidence cannot be the most basic significance of 
disagreement. If the significance of disagreement is such as would call for 
diminished confidence, then that significance does not belong to all disagreements 
by default. This raises the question: what significance does disagreement have 
already? What calls for the investigation to determine when disagreement calls for 
diminished confidence, and when it does not.  
The assessment necessary for any diminishment of confidence must itself be 
called for. Why would we ever assess the epistemic ability of our opponent in a 
disagreement? If disagreement is without significance until assessment has been 
carried out, then why would anyone ever take the trouble to carry out an 
assessment? It is only when something grabs our attention that we pay it any mind, 
let alone investigate it. Since it is taken for granted by everyone that assessing 
those with whom one is in disagreement makes sense, it must be the case that 
something about being in disagreement with another grabs our attention. In other 
words—disagreement is significant. 
Evaluation is only rational in case there is a more fundamental significance 
of disagreement that is not dependent upon peerhood. There must be a more basic 
significance, belonging to any disagreement whatsoever, that motivates the 
evaluation of opponents in the first place. A basic significance of disagreement 
must provide the impetus for the curiosity that drives investigation into the matter. 
If, as social epistemologists claim, disagreement with an opponent of a 
certain character (an expert or a peer) can possess altogether different significance, 
that significance can only be attached to the disagreement after an assessment of 
the opponent’s relative epistemic fitness has been undertaken; an activity which no 
one would have any reason to engage in if there was not already some significance 
which called for it. Paradoxical though it may seem, the significance of peer 
disagreement—that one should be concerned about being in error oneself—is only 
possible because of (and as a correction to) the prior significance that one’s 
opposition is in error. 
Does disagreement possess this more fundamental kind of significance? Does 
it possess a significance which is relevant to knowledge of the object of the dispute 
in question, yet which does not rely on evaluation of one’s opponents or, indeed, 
which does not hinge on any further particular qualities of that dispute? Does 
disagreement possess a kind of significance just in virtue of being disagreement? If 
so, what would that significance be? 
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Epistemology of disagreement has treated disagreement which is not 
qualified according to the peer condition as insignificant because it has not 
recognised any quality that belongs to disagreement in general which differentiates 
it from the merely possible disagreement which could attach to any belief. As long 
as actual unqualified disagreement is not distinguished from merely possible 
disagreement, or the mere possibility of there being a view that conflicts with your 
own, there is nothing about it to attract your attention. Only if the fact that 
someone happens to champion one of the indefinite number of possible positions 
that contradict one of your own can be differentiated from the mere possibility 
that such a position might be held, can an epistemic significance which belongs to 
disagreement as such be discerned. Only if it is shown that the significance of the 
fact that there is a person confronting you with an opposing point of view cannot 
be reduced to the significance of the reasons that might be produced to support 
that view can a general significance of disagreement be said to exist. 
There is such a significance. Actual disagreement has a significance that is 
not reducible either to the significance of a possible disagreement and the reasons 
in favour of it, nor to the merely heuristic function that a representative of a 
possible view might have, such as providing formulations and arguments that make 
the view easier to consider (and therefore to refute). The difference is this: when I 
consider a merely possible objection to my belief, I am not compelled to adopt the 
further belief that another person is wrong, but when another person disagrees 
with my belief, I am compelled to accept that there is a person who is wrong as a 
corollary to the fact that our beliefs are in conflict with one another 
This is what disagreement introduces: my knowledge that a person disagrees 
with my belief signifies their wrongness. The being in error of another person is 
signified only by actual disagreement, not by merely possible disagreement, nor by 
the mere existence of opposing views. 
5. Why Intersubjective Significance Matters 
It is fair to call this significance obvious, but it is not trivial. A circumstance in 
which you hold a belief that you know someone might possibly take issue with and 
a circumstance in which that belief brings you into actual conflict with another 
person are not equivalent. In the case of actual disagreement, your position 
commits you not only to the belief in that position itself but also to the belief that 
your opponent is wrong, while in cases of merely possible disagreement your views 
do not commit you to any similar judgments about another person’s epistemic 
state. 
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As long as your position was justified, the same reasons that support it 
should have no trouble supporting the weight of its corollaries, so the indication 
that another person is wrong should not be an occasion for self-doubt. This means 
that the basic significance I am drawing attention to is not a roundabout way of 
getting at an indication of likely error, and if the wrongness of another person is 
indicated, that is not meaningful solely because it indicates that you might be 
wrong instead. 
This raises the question of what difference this significance makes. If 
disagreement signifies to you that your opponent is wrong, what does that matter? 
To be specific, what is it about your opponent being wrong that would call for 
assessment of the epistemic fitness of your opponent, or any other further 
discussion or investigation? This is the question that brought us here: what calls for 
assessment of opponents? However, it is not immediately obvious why assessment 
would be called for by the indication that your opponent was wrong. On the 
contrary, it seems that this significance would preempt any call for assessment; 
does it not indicate, on the face of it, that your interlocutor is not your peer, since 
it indicates that they are wrong? 
The basic, intersubjective significance of disagreement is not merely an 
indirect route to the self-reflexive significance that you should be concerned about 
the chance that you could be wrong. The wrongness of the other person signifies 
something about the other person, and that is where its meaning lies. This is to say 
that the basic significance of disagreement is irreducibly intersubjective. It is the 
epistemic failure of the other, and not something about my own epistemic state, 
that disagreement signifies. Further epistemic activity is called for directly by the 
indication that the other is wrong, and it is called for even if nothing in the 
intersubjective significance of disagreement ever leads to self-reflexive 
significance. I will explain why.  
Disagreement indicates that the other person is wrong, it does not 
demonstrate it conclusively. It suggests something in the way that evidence that is 
not conclusive evidence suggests. It may be univocal, but without being 
conclusive. As a suggestion, it does not settle the question. Rather, it raises it. It 
does not demonstrate conclusively that the other is absolutely wrong in their 
belief, thereby rendering any further inquiry superfluous. Instead, it raises the 
question of the other’s wrongness precisely by indicating that that is the case. It 
makes perfect sense, then, that this would call for further investigation of the other 
person, including assessment of their epistemic ability, as long as uncertainty 
remains about whether what is indicated by the disagreement is true. 
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Conclusion 
Despite the interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement in social 
epistemology, there has not been any attention paid to what the significance of 
disagreement is. Neglect of this question has led to two problems. For one, it has 
led to an impossible notion of default peerhood which ignores the necessity 
(belonging to the very concept of peerhood) that peerhood must be conferred upon 
assessment. More seriously, it has preserved an excessive narrowness in the way 
that epistemology of disagreement considers the epistemological meaning of 
disagreement. This narrowness is by design, and it has beneficially excluded 
contextual sociological and psychological questions from the narrow scope of the 
question of what, if anything, is learned about the disputandum from the fact that 
there is controversy surrounding it. 
However, the narrowing of the scope of the question goes too far in 
considering the epistemic significance of disagreement solely in terms of how and 
under what circumstances it impinges on your own ability to be reasonably 
certain. I have argued that, considered strictly epistemologically, the beliefs of 
others and the correctness of those beliefs are relevant to the epistemic 
circumstance of the disputandum itself, which is to say to the narrowly determined 
question of disagreement at issue in social epistemology. It is because of what 
disagreement tells us about the beliefs of others that it can tell us about the 
disputandum, in which our primary interest lies. This means that, in order to 
understand the epistemic significance of disagreement, we cannot exclude what it 
tells us about the intersubjective context in which our own beliefs exist.26 
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